

## Lecture 2. Reconstruction Attacks.

- De-identified data ~~X~~ ; releasing "Aggregate" Statistics?
- Warmup : Difference Attacks
- Reconstruction examples
- Reconstruction Formulation  
Linear Attacks [Dinur & Nissim 03]

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What should "privacy" mean?

## Warmup : Difference Attacks

Q: How many people were born on 1992 and live in Zipcode 15206 and have a heart disease?

A: ~~1~~ 5

Q: How many faculty members @ CMU joined before 9/1/2020 and have had a heart disease?

A: 37

Q: How many faculty members @ CMU joined before 9/2/2020 and have had a heart disease?

A: 38

## 2. Targeting

**Location**

Country:

Everywhere  
 By State/Province  
 By City

Include cities within  miles.

**Demographics**

Age:  -

Sex:  All  Men  Women

Birthday:  Target people on their birthdays

Interested In:  All  Men  Women

Relationship:  All  Single  Engaged  
 In a Relationship  Married

Languages:

Fewer Demographic Options

**Likes & Interests**

**Education & Work**

Education:  All  College Grad

In College  
 In High School

Workplaces:

Hide Education & Work Options

Facebook ad campaign targeting interface.

Ref: Korolova,  
"Privacy violation Using  
Microtargeted Ads: A Case Study"

# Reconstruction in the US Census.

- 3 Males
- Ages  $A \leq B \leq C$
- $1 \leq A \leq B \leq C \leq 125$
- Median = 30  $\Rightarrow B = 30$   
 $A \leq 30, C \geq 30$
- Mean  $\frac{A+B+C}{3} = 44$   
 $\Rightarrow A+C = 102$

(A,C) has 30 possible choices.

Before =  $(125)^3$   $\rightarrow$  ~~etc~~ possible choices

TABLE 1: FICTIONAL STATISTICAL DATA FOR A FICTIONAL BLOCK

STATISTIC	GROUP	AGE		
		COUNT	MEDIAN	MEAN
1A	total population	7	30	38
2A	female	4	30	33.5
2B	male	3	30	44
2C	black or African American	4	31	48.5
2D	white	3	24	24
3A	single adults	(D)	(D)	(D)
3B	married adults	4	51	54
4A	black or African American female	3	36	36.7
4B	black or African American male	(D)	(D)	(D)
4C	white male	(D)	(D)	(D)
4D	white female	(D)	(D)	(D)
5A	persons under 5 years	(D)	(D)	(D)
5B	persons under 18 years	(D)	(D)	(D)
5C	persons 64 years or over	(D)	(D)	(D)

Note: Married persons must be 15 or over

Garfinkel, Aband, Marsindale 2018.

TABLE 2: POSSIBLE AGES FOR A MEDIAN OF 30 AND MEAN OF 44

A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
1	30	101	11	30	91	21	30	81
2	30	100	12	30	90	22	30	80
3	30	99	13	30	89	23	30	79
4	30	98	14	30	88	24	30	78
5	30	97	15	30	87	25	30	77
6	30	96	16	30	86	26	30	76
7	30	95	17	30	85	27	30	75
8	30	94	18	30	84	28	30	74
9	30	93	19	30	83	29	30	73
10	30	92	20	30	82	30	30	72

# Reconstruction in the US Census 2010.

Variable	Range
Block	6,207,027 inhabited blocks
Sex	2 (Female/Male)
Age	103 (0-99 single age year categories, 100-104, 105-109, 110+)
Race	63 allowable race combinations
Ethnicity	2 (Hispanic/Not)
Relationship	17 values

Publication	Released counts
PL94-171 Redistricting	2,771,998,263
Balance of Summary File 1	2,806,899,669
Total Statistics in PL94-171 and Balance of SF1:	5,578,897,932
Published Statistics/person	18
Recall: Collected variables/person:	6
<b>Published Statistics/collected variable</b>	<b>18 ÷ 6 = 3</b>

5.5 billion simultaneous equations

on 1.8 billion unknown integers

## Reconstruction Formulation

Dataset  $X$

Statistics  $f_1, \dots, f_k$

answers

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a_1 \approx f_1(X) \\ a_2 \approx f_2(X) \\ \vdots \\ a_k \approx f_k(X) \end{array} \right. \rightarrow \text{Constraints.}$$

Reconstruction Problem: Given "constraints"  $\{f_i(X) \approx a_i\}$ ,  
find a dataset  $\tilde{X}$  that is consistent w/ the constraints.

Satisfiability Problem.

Worse-case NP-hard.

↓  
looks almost the same as  $X$ .

# Linear Reconstruction Attack

- Introduced by Dinur & Nissim in 2003  $\rightarrow$  development of Differential Privacy. 06

Dataset  $\rightarrow$

Name	Postal Code	Age	Sex	Has Disease?
Alice	02445	36	F	1
Bob	02446	18	M	0
Charlie	02118	66	M	1
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$
Zora	02120	40	F	1

Identifiers	Secret
$z_1$	$s_1$
$z_2$	$s_2$
$z_3$	$s_3$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$
$z_n$	$s_n$

$\leftarrow$  Abstractly

$Z$ : identifiers      Secret bit

Release count statistics: # people satisfy some property

- How many people are older than 40 & have secret bit = 1?

$$f(x) = \sum_{j=1}^n \underbrace{\varphi(z_j)}_{\text{property on } z_i} s_j \quad \text{for some } \varphi: Z \mapsto \{0,1\}$$

$$f(x) = \left( \underbrace{\varphi(z_1), \varphi(z_2), \dots, \varphi(z_n)}_{\text{bit vector}} \right) \cdot \left( \underbrace{s_1, \dots, s_n}_{\text{secret bits}} \right)$$

## Releasing $k$ linear Statistics

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Released} \\ \text{Statistics} \end{array} \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} f_1(x) \\ \vdots \\ f_k(x) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \varphi_1(z_1) & \dots & \varphi_1(z_n) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \varphi_k(z_1) & \dots & \varphi_k(z_n) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s_1 \\ \vdots \\ s_n \end{bmatrix} \leftarrow \text{Secret bits}$$

$F$

$$f_i(x) = F_i \cdot s$$

Examples :

$\varphi_1(z_j) = 1$  :  $z_j$  is older than 40

$\varphi_2(z_j) = 1$  :  $z_j$  is older than 40 and male

$\varphi_3(z_j) = 1$  :  $z_j$  is older than 20 and male



## First Reconstruction Attack

"You can't release all count statistics with non-trivial accuracy."  
if "privacy-preserving"

Queries:  $k=2^n$

For every  $v \in \{0,1\}^n$ ,  $F_v = v$

Reconstruction:

Suppose the answers  $(a_v)_{v \in \{0,1\}^n}$ ,  $\forall v \in \{0,1\}^n$ ,  $\left[ \underbrace{|F_v \cdot s - a_v|}_{\substack{\text{True answer} \\ \downarrow \\ \text{Released answer}}} \leq \alpha n \right]$

Choose  $\tilde{s} \in \{0,1\}^n$ ,  $\forall v$ ,  $\underbrace{|F_v \cdot \tilde{s} - a_v|}_{\text{Constraints}} \leq \alpha \cdot n$   $\alpha = 5\%$

Theorem.  $\|s - \tilde{s}\|_1 \leq 4\alpha n$

reconstruct 80%  
of secrets.

Theorem. If all  $2^n$  counts are within  $2n$  error,  
 then  $s, \tilde{s}$  disagree on  $\leq 42n$  bits.

Proof Intuition.

$a_f$ : Released answer

$$s = [1011 \text{ ---}]$$

$f \cdot s$ : true answer

$$\tilde{s} = [0100 \text{ ---}]$$



property that capture diff.

$$\rightarrow |a_f - f \cdot s| \leq 2n$$

Reconstruction: find  $\tilde{s}$

$$\rightarrow |a_f - f \cdot \tilde{s}| \leq 2n$$

$$f \cdot \tilde{s} \approx a_f$$



Theorem. If all  $2^n$  counts are within  $\alpha n$  error,  
then  $s, \tilde{s}$  disagree on  $\leq 4\alpha n$  bits.

Proof Sketch.

Two sets:  $S_{01} = \{j : s_j = 0 \ \& \ \tilde{s}_j = 1\}$   
 $S_{10} = \{j : s_j = 1 \ \& \ \tilde{s}_j = 0\}$

If  $\|s - \tilde{s}\|_2 > 4\alpha n \leftarrow$  Proof by contradiction.

$\Rightarrow |S_{01}| > 2\alpha n$  or  $|S_{10}| > 2\alpha n$  Statistic

$\Rightarrow$  there exists  $v \in \{0,1\}$  such that  $|v \cdot (\tilde{s} - s)| > 2\alpha n$

$\Rightarrow |v \cdot \tilde{s} - a_v| > 2\alpha n - |v \cdot s - a_v| > \alpha n$  Contradiction

$\Rightarrow$  Contradiction Triangle Ineq  $\leq \alpha n$

## Reconstruction Using Fewer Queries

# Released Statistics  $\ll 2^n$  ?

Dinur & Nissim

Attack : Choose  $k=20n$  random  $\varphi_i: Z \mapsto \{0,1\}$ ,  $\forall i \in [k]$ .

$\Rightarrow$   $k$  random vectors/queries  $F_i \in \{0,1\}^n$

Suppose that answers =  $\forall i \in [k]$ ,  $|F_i \cdot s - a_i| \leq \alpha n$

Find  $\tilde{s} \in \{0,1\}^n$  such that:  $\forall i \in [k]$ ,  $|F_i \cdot \tilde{s} - a_i| \leq \alpha n$

Theorem.  $\|s - \tilde{s}\|_1 \leq \frac{256 \alpha^2 n^2}{\text{w.h.p.}}$

$$\alpha \lesssim \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}$$