

Lecture 11.

Composing k ϵ -DP mech

- Advanced Composition
 - " $k\epsilon$ "
Basic
 - " $\sqrt{k}\epsilon$ "
Advanced
- Recap : (ϵ, δ) -DP
- Privacy loss as a random variable
- Simulation Lemma


(ϵ, δ) -DP "Approx DP"

A is (ϵ, δ) -differentially private if
for all neighbors x and x'
for all subsets E of outputs

$$\mathbb{P}[A(x) \in E] \leq \underbrace{e^\epsilon \mathbb{P}[A(x') \in E]}_{\text{additive.}} + \delta$$

→ Gaussian Mechanism $\delta \ll \frac{1}{n}$

Adaptive Composition



If each of A_1, \dots, A_k is (ϵ, δ) -DP (for any prefix outcome y_2, \dots, y_{j+1})

- Basic Composition : $(\tilde{\epsilon} = k\epsilon, \tilde{\delta} = k\delta)$ - DP
- Advanced Composition :

$$\tilde{\epsilon} = \epsilon \cdot \sqrt{2k \ln(\frac{1}{\delta})} + k \cdot \epsilon \cdot \left[\frac{e^{\epsilon}-1}{e^{\epsilon}+1} \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{2}}$$

$$\tilde{\delta} = k\delta + \delta' \quad \text{for } \epsilon \leq 1, \dots, (\epsilon \sqrt{k})^2$$

In general:

$$\text{think } \tilde{\epsilon} = \bar{\epsilon}k \epsilon$$

$$\tilde{\delta} = \delta k$$

If $\epsilon < \frac{1}{\sqrt{k}}$

$(\epsilon \sqrt{k})^2$ is "smaller"

Then $\tilde{\epsilon}$ is in the order of $\epsilon \sqrt{k}$ ignoring log terms

$$e^\epsilon \approx 1 + \epsilon, \quad \frac{e^\epsilon - 1}{e^\epsilon + 1} \approx \frac{\epsilon}{2}$$

Numeric Example.

$$\varepsilon = \frac{1}{1000}, \quad \delta = 0.$$

$$k = 500,$$

Basic Composition : $\tilde{\varepsilon} = 0.5, \tilde{\delta} = 0.$

Advanced Composition : $\tilde{\varepsilon} \leq 0.1, \tilde{\delta} = 10^{-6}$

Example : Answer k adaptive queries

- Laplace mechanism + Basic Composition $(\tilde{\epsilon}, \delta)$ -DP

$$\text{Expected error} \approx \frac{k}{\tilde{\epsilon}}$$

- Gaussian — + Basic — $(\tilde{\epsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$ -DP

$$— \approx \frac{k}{\tilde{\epsilon}} \sqrt{\ln(\frac{k}{\delta})}$$

- Laplace — + Advanced — $(\tilde{\epsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$ -DP

$$— \approx \boxed{\frac{\sqrt{Nk}}{\tilde{\epsilon}} \sqrt{\ln(\frac{1}{\delta})}}$$

- Gaussian — + Advanced — $(\tilde{\epsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$ -DP.

$$— \approx \frac{\sqrt{Nk}}{\tilde{\epsilon}} \sqrt{\ln(\frac{k}{\delta})}$$

Better ways
to analyze this.

Privacy Loss as a Random Variable.

Given a randomized algorithm A
 inputs $x \& x'$, and output $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.

$$I_{x,x'}^A(y) = \ln \left(\frac{\Pr[A(x)=y]}{\Pr[A(x')=y]} \right) \quad \leftarrow \text{privacy loss.}$$

- $Y \leftarrow A(x)$ is random

Think $I_{x,x'}^A(Y)$ as a random variable

Recall • How to prove ϵ -DP? $\underline{I_{x,x'}^A(Y) \leq \epsilon}$, \forall neighbors $x \& x'$

- How to prove (ϵ, δ) -DP?

$$\underbrace{\Pr_{Y \in A(x)}[I_{x,x'}^A \leq \epsilon]}_{\geq 1-\delta}$$

- A is a composition of A_1, \dots, A_k

$$\Pr[A(x) = (y_1, \dots, y_k)] = \Pr[A_1(x) = y_1] \cdot \Pr[A_2(x, y_1) = y_2] \cdots \Pr[A_k(x, y_1, \dots, y_{k-1}) = y_k]$$

$$\underbrace{I_{x,x'}^A(y_1, \dots, y_k)}_{=} = \sum_{j=1}^k \ln \left(\frac{\Pr[A_j(x; y_1, \dots, y_{j-1}) = y_j]}{\Pr[A_j(x'; y_1, \dots, y_{j-1}) = y_j]} \right)$$

$$\text{Total Privacy loss} = \sum_{j=1}^k \underbrace{I_{x,x'}^{A_j(x, y_1, \dots, y_{j-1})}(y_j)}_{\text{Individual Privacy losses}}$$

Basic Composition: each term $\leq \epsilon$

$$\Rightarrow I_{x,x'}^A \leq k\epsilon$$

Advanced Composition: $\mathbb{E}[\text{each term}] \leq O(\epsilon^2)$

Remove some bad events $\Rightarrow \sqrt{k}\epsilon$.

Examples:

1) Gaussian Mechanism

$$A(x) = f(x) + \mathcal{Z}, \quad \mathcal{Z} \sim N(0, \sigma^2), \quad GS_f \leq 1.$$

$$\sigma = \frac{2\sqrt{\ln(1/\delta)}}{\epsilon}$$

$$I_{x,x'}^A(Y) = \frac{1 - 2\mathcal{Z}}{2\sigma^2} \hookrightarrow \sim N\left(\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}, \frac{1}{\sigma^2}\right)$$

2) Randomized Response

$$RR(x) = (y_1, \dots, y_n), \quad w/ \quad y_i = \begin{cases} x_i & w.p. \frac{e^\epsilon}{1+e^\epsilon} \\ 1-x_i & w.p. \frac{1}{1+e^\epsilon} \end{cases} \quad \uparrow \text{flip} \quad \downarrow \epsilon e^\epsilon$$

$$I_{x,x'}^A(y_1, \dots, y_n) = \begin{cases} \epsilon & \text{if } y_i = x_i \\ -\epsilon & \text{o/w } y_i \neq x_i \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[I_{x,x'}^A(y_1, \dots, y_n)] &= \epsilon \cdot \frac{e^\epsilon}{e^\epsilon + 1} + (-\epsilon) \cdot \frac{1}{e^\epsilon + 1} \\ &= \epsilon \cdot \underbrace{\left[\frac{e^{\epsilon-1}}{e^\epsilon + 1} \right]}_{\approx \frac{\epsilon}{2}}. \end{aligned}$$

$\hookrightarrow \approx \frac{\epsilon}{2} \text{ for } \epsilon \leq 1.$

3) "Name & Shame"

$$NS_\delta(x_1, \dots, x_n) = (y_1, \dots, y_n) \quad \uparrow \text{Privacy loss o/f}$$

$$y_i = \begin{cases} x_i & w.p. \delta \\ \perp & w.p. 1-\delta \end{cases}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[I_{x,x'}^{NS_\delta}(Y)] = \text{∅} \quad \text{"Remove } \delta \text{ bad event"}$$

Examples of privacy losses

Idea for Advanced Composition

- 1) Reduction "Leaky Randomized Response" (LRR)
- 2) It suffices to prove the advanced composition for CRR.

Given two random variables U, V

$$\begin{aligned} U &\stackrel{\sim_{\varepsilon, \delta}}{\sim} V && (\varepsilon, \delta)\text{-indistinguishable} \\ \forall E \subseteq Y, \quad P[U \in E] &\leq e^\varepsilon P[V \in E] + \delta \\ P[V \in E] &\leq e^\varepsilon P[U \in E] + \delta. \end{aligned}$$

Simple pair of (U, V)

$U, V \in \{0, 1, "U", "V"\}$

	P_U	P_V
0	$(1-\delta) \frac{e^\epsilon}{1+e^\epsilon}$	$(1-\delta) \frac{1}{1+e^\epsilon}$
1	$(1-\delta) \frac{1}{1+e^\epsilon}$	$(1-\delta) \frac{e^\epsilon}{1+e^\epsilon}$
"U"	δ	0
"V"	0	δ


[Simulation Lemma.]

If $Y \underset{\epsilon, \delta}{\sim} Y'$,

there exists a
(randomized) mapping F
such that

$F(U) \sim Y$

$F(V) \sim Y'$.



Using the Simulation Lemma

Fix x, x' as neighbors
 partial output y_1, \dots, y_{j-1}

$$A_j(x; y_1, \dots, y_{j-1}) \quad A_j(x'; y_1, \dots, y_{j-1})$$

f_j such that

$$F_j(u) \sim A_j(x; y_1, \dots, y_{j-1})$$

$$F_j(v) \sim A_j(x'; y_1, \dots, y_{j-1})$$

There exists F^* such that $F^*(u_1, \dots, u_k) \sim A(x)$ Composition

$$F^*(v_1, \dots, v_k) \sim A(x')$$

Lemma: If $\underbrace{(u_1, \dots, u_k)}_{\tilde{\Sigma}, \tilde{\delta}} \approx_{\tilde{\Sigma}, \tilde{\delta}} \underbrace{(v_1, \dots, v_k)}_{\tilde{\Sigma}, \tilde{\delta}}$

then by post-processing

$$A(x) \approx_{\tilde{\Sigma}, \tilde{\delta}} A(x') \quad \leftarrow \text{Goal.}$$

Consequence

If $(u_1, \dots, u_k) \approx_{\varepsilon, s} (v_1, \dots, v_k)$

then by post-processing $A(x) \approx_{\varepsilon, s} A(x')$.

Lemma. $(u_1, \dots, u_k) \approx_{\varepsilon, \tilde{s}} (v_1, \dots, v_k)$

for $\tilde{\varepsilon} = \varepsilon \sqrt{2k \ln(1/\delta')} + k \varepsilon \cdot \frac{e^{\varepsilon}-1}{e^{\varepsilon}+1}$

$$\tilde{s} = ks + s'$$

